We provide theoretical and empirical evidence that policy uncertainty can significantly a¤ect …rm level investment and entry decisions in the context of international trade. When market entry costs are sunk, policy uncertainty can create a real option value of waiting to enter foreign markets until conditions improve or uncertainty is resolved. Using a dynamic, heterogeneous …rms model we show that: (i) investment and entry into export markets is reduced when trade policy is uncertain, and (ii) preferential trade agreements (PTAs) are valuable to exporters even if applied trade barriers are currently low or zero. We derive a structural equation that predicts how …rm entry responds to changes in applied tari¤s and a theory-based measure of policy uncertainty. Our novel approach using observable trade policies allows us to estimate the impact of policy uncertainty and quantify its aggregate implications. We apply this method to Portugal's accession to the European Community in 1986 using new …rm-level trade data. We …nd that (i) the trade policy reform accounted for a large fraction of the observed Portuguese exporting …rms' entry and sales upon accession (ii) the accession removed uncertainty about future preferences and (iii) this uncertainty channel accounted for a large fraction of the predicted growth. These results have broader implications for other PTAs and our approach can be applied to analyze other sources of policy uncertainty.
Introduction
Firms face considerable uncertainty about future conditions a¤ecting their costs, demand and pro…tability.
This uncertainty can arise from purely economic shocks-e.g. to productivity or tastes-or policy shockse.g. monetary and …scal innovations, tax and regulatory reforms. The role of future conditions is particularly important when …rms must decide on costly irreversible investments such as adopting a technology, producing a new good or selling in a new market. In these cases, …rms may wait for current conditions to be su¢ ciently good or for uncertainty about future conditions to be su¢ ciently low before they invest.
We examine the impact of policy uncertainty on a …rm's decision to invest and export to new markets, which is an interesting setting for several reasons. First, exports account for an increasingly large share of …rms' sales and thus global integration has considerably increased their exposure to foreign policy uncertainty. Second, while much trade analysis assumes policy is either …xed or follows a certain deterministic path, we argue that trade policy can be quite uncertain. This uncertainty arises not because trade policy changes very frequently but because when it does, the changes can be quite large and persistent. One recent example was the widespread fear during the great recession that countries would shut their markets to international trade, as they did in the 1930's. 1 In section 3 we provide additional examples of trade policy uncertainty. Third, there is growing evidence that …rms must incur substantial …xed costs before exporting (cf. Roberts and Tybout, 1997) . To capture the interaction between these …xed cost investments and policy uncertainty we develop a tractable dynamic heterogenous …rm model and derive the impacts of current and future trade policy on investment and export decisions. We then test the predictions of the model and quantify its aggregate implications by combining novel and detailed …rm-level and trade policy data.
Our work is also motivated by the importance of domestic policy uncertainty for economic activity, which has been the subject of recent debate. 2 The basic theoretical impacts of uncertainty on investment are understood (cf. Bernanke, 1983 and the references in section 2), and there is some recent evidence for the e¤ects of aggregate volatility shocks. 3 However, there is scant empirical evidence of the importance of policy uncertainty for …rms, even though thousands of …rms worldwide rank it as 'one of the most important constraints in doing business ' (World Bank Development Report, 2005) . The scant evidence is partly due to the di¢ culty in measuring policy uncertainty and linking it to speci…c investment decisions. The 1 international trade setting can help address these issues. First, it allows us to construct detailed measures of policy uncertainty that are easy-to-interpret and vary across several dimensions: countries, products and time. Second, we can trace the e¤ects of these measures to speci…c …rm investment and sales decisions that also vary along those dimensions. To the extent that other taxes and regulations are persistent but uncertain, as trade policy is, our …ndings can be informative for those domestic policies as well.
Our basic theoretical framework can be applied to di¤erent settings. However, in order to clearly measure trade policy uncertainty (henceforth TPU) and estimate its e¤ects, we must focus on a speci…c application.
We analyze preferential trade agreements (PTAs), whereby countries eliminate protection relative to a subset of partners, which is the most active form of trade policy in the last 20 years. As of July 2010, there were 283 PTAs in force-a dramatic increase since 1990-and 474 have so far been noti…ed to the World Trade Organization (WTO). 4 There are multiple reasons for PTAs and active research on their real value. The increased probability of membership in a PTA can be a source of TPU because in any given year an exporter has a higher probability of obtaining either a price advantage (if it becomes a PTA member) or disadvantage (if another country does). This uncertainty is not fully resolved upon membership since some preferences are subject to renewal, which explains why certain countries receiving unilateral preferences have agreed to liberalize their own markets in exchange for removing preference uncertainty (e.g. the recent Colombia-U.S.
PTA). We discuss this motivation for several recent PTAs in section 3.
To examine the impact of TPU on …rms we require detailed data. We will argue that Portugal's accession to the European Community (EC) provides an excellent setting to study this issue for several reasons. First, the focus on a speci…c country and policy event allows us to cleanly identify the e¤ect and carefully control for a number of factors. Second, we expect the e¤ects of TPU to be most important for small, developing, open economies where trade is central both to consumers and …rms. 5 So, Portugal's experience in 1986
can be highly relevant for many developing countries currently seeking secure access to the U.S. and EC markets. Third, Portuguese trade increased dramatically after 1986. As we document in section 3, that increase was largest towards the EC partners, suggesting that it was caused by the accession. Finally, the export expansion upon accession was characterized by considerable entry of Portuguese …rms exporting into EC markets even in industries where applied tari¤s did not change, which indicates the potential role for the agreement in reducing TPU. In section 3 we show that this expansion cannot be explained by standard aggregate determinants of trade such as income and exchange rates.
While the aggregate results suggest a role for the accession to a¤ect entry investments via a change in expectations about future trade policies they may also be consistent with other explanations. Thus we view the aggregate results as motivating evidence for the core of the paper, which is devoted to developing a dynamic model to show precisely how reductions in TPU increase …rm entry and trade and then carefully testing its predictions with disaggregated data. More speci…cally, in section 4 we derive a structural equation that relates the entry decision to current policy and a measure of TPU: the percent loss in pro…ts due to a negative tari¤ shock that eliminates tari¤ preferences.
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In section 5 we test and …nd evidence for the entry and export predictions by carefully exploring rich variation in …rm entry and policy across di¤erent countries (EC-10 vs. Spain), industries and time. We estimate that Portuguese exporters believed that the probability of losing preferences was not negligible before accession but it went to zero after full EC accession. So the agreement eliminated that source of TPU. Overall, the trade policy changes accounted for a substantial share of the observed growth in entry (61%) and export value (87%) in the data. Moreover, we perform counterfactual calculations based on the empirical estimates and the structural model to decompose the role of changes in applied tari¤s vs.
changes in expected tari¤s. We …nd that the applied tari¤ changes can account only for between 0.4-0.5 of the total policy e¤ect for Spain and 0.1-0.2 for the EC-10, so a large part of the PTA's e¤ect was due to the credible elimination of TPU. In this sense our results may have broader implications for evaluating how the investment and market-entry e¤ects of other types of trade or tax policy reforms depend on their credibility.
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In the …nal section we discuss additional applications of our framework and implications of the results.
Related Literature
To examine the impact of policy uncertainty we focus on a dynamic model of …rm investment and entry.
If entry costs are sunk and at least partially irreversible, a prospective …rm must consider the time path of other variables that a¤ect pro…tability. Dixit (1989) shows that uncertainty about future prices creates an option value of waiting so …rms will delay investments in entry or exit until they receive more information.
In this setting, entry and exit depend on the variance of shocks, their persistence and the size of sunk costs. Baldwin and Krugman (1989) extend these theoretical insights in a model with uncertainty about the exchange rate and homogenous …rms. They show there is a possibility for "beachhead e¤ects": after a …rm receives a positive shock and pays the sunk cost of entry into exporting it will not immediately reverse its investment even if the initial shock is reversed. Thus even temporary shocks can have lasting e¤ects.
There is considerable evidence that …rms are heterogenous, a fact that is particularly important in 6 The fact that TPU a¤ects entry only via the loss of preferences re ‡ects the bad news principle that is present in investment models with an option value of waiting. 7 To the extent that some PTAs are more credible than others our results can help explain recent aggregate evidence on large impacts of some PTAs on trade ‡ows and the mixed results for others ). the context of international trade. Starting with Bernard and Jensen (1995) an extensive literature has developed, which documents the fact that exporters tend to be larger and more e¢ cient than non-exporters and tend to self-select into exporting.
8 Several recent models incorporate …rm heterogeneity and show it has important theoretical and empirical implications for trade (cf. Melitz, 2003, and Bernard et al. 2003) . In these models the extensive margin may dominate the response of trade ‡ows to reductions in trade barriers (Chaney, 2008) . We therefore focus on a dynamic, heterogeneous …rms model of export market entry.
Evidence of sunk costs in export-market entry (cf. Roberts and Tybout, 1997) , has lead some to consider alternative sources of uncertainty such as exchange rates, demand and productivity that can generate real option problems in trade models. Aggregate and …rm-level analysis has focused on exchange rate volatility, about which evidence remains mixed (Baldwin, 1988; Campa, 2004; Das et al., 2007) . More broadly, studies of the impact of exchange rate volatility on aggregate trade ‡ows …nd that e¤ect is negative but "fairly small and is by no means robust" (IMF, 2004, p.6 ).
The impact of trade and tax policy uncertainty when there are sunk costs of investment, has received far less attention. One di¢ culty is that most policy processes are not readily adapted to a standard stochastic process and major regime changes may be infrequent. Perhaps because of this di¢ culty, trade models generally assume policy is static or that reforms are either fully anticipated or unanticipated (cf. Constantini and Melitz, 2008; Burstein and Melitz, 2011) . But even if major reforms are rare events they may be important for investment decisions, as recently emphasized in a di¤erent context by Barro (2006) . The scant work on policy uncertainty is largely theoretical, for example Rodrik (1991) develops a model of capital investment when …rms believe an investment tax credit reform may be reversed in the future. If the probability or cost of a policy reversal is high, a reform to promote investment may produce exactly the opposite outcome. Empirically, Aizenman and Marion (1993) show that low persistence of monetary and …scal aggregates has negative e¤ects on aggregate investment and growth in cross-country regressions.
There is an ongoing empirical debate regarding the value of bilateral and multilateral trade agreements.
Early work on the trade e¤ects of PTAs delivered mixed results, e.g. Frankel (1997) reports small and sometimes negative e¤ects of EC membership on bilateral trade between members in the 1960s and 1970s but positive ones in the 1980s and 1990s. , after controlling for potential selection into agreements, …nd that PTAs can increase trade by as much as 100%. Other explanations for large trade impacts of some PTAs include competitive reallocation and productivity enhancing investments induced by trade liberalization (cf. Constantini and Melitz, 2008; Tre ‡er, 2004) . Alternatively, PTAs may imply permanent reductions in trade frictions so future shocks to macro variables may have larger e¤ects on expected pro…ts, which can generate entry as argued by Ruhl (2008) . The latter motive is related to the one we explore but we model the TPU channel and estimate its impact econometrically. Much less is known about how and why trade grows following PTAs because few studies examine the details of the policy change.
Our model captures how a reduction in TPU-caused by switching regimes from unilateral market access to a reciprocal PTA-can increase entry and trade. We test this prediction with an empirical method that closely links the theory to …rm-level data. In a related paper, Handley (2012) extends the model we employ to analyze whether the WTO mitigates TPU by requiring countries to bind their tari¤s at a maximum level.
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In his setup, the TPU faced by exporters is measured by the gap between applied and WTO bound tari¤s.
He …nds that this form of TPU, which exploits variation in policy commitments within the WTO regime, lowers both the level of product entry and the elasticity of entry to applied tari¤ reductions in Australia.
Trade Policy Uncertainty and Portugal' s European Integration
In this section we provide evidence for the importance of TPU, which helps motivate our theoretical model.
We …rst describe some basic features of the world trading system and highlight several potential sources of TPU that can potentially be captured using our basic framework. We then focus on how certain trade agreements can reduce TPU and provide background information and aggregate evidence for a speci…c one:
Portugal's accession to the European Community (EC) in 1986, which generated considerable growth in export …rm entry and aggregate exports into those markets. We argue that this aggregate evidence is consistent with an uncertainty-reducing role of EC accession but possibly also with other explanations thus in section 5 we explore speci…c predictions with disaggregated data.
Trade Policy Uncertainty in the World Trading System
As we note in the Introduction there are good reasons to be concerned about TPU and yet very little research on its sources and impacts. This may partly be due to the fact that trade policy is perceived not to be very volatile; after all statutory tari¤ rates are legislated at most on a yearly basis. However, this perceived low volatility in statutory tari¤s is misleading for two reasons. First, even if statutory trade reforms are infrequent when they occur the changes can be quite large and persistent. Second, applied trade policy is more volatile than statutory tari¤ rates since there are many non-tari¤ barriers (NTBs). 10 Several of these NTBs are not strictly (if at all) regulated by the WTO and even the ones that are can be used by countries, sometimes on a "temporary" basis and for speci…c goods. But even "temporary" measures can remain in 9 Independent work by Sala et al. (2010) also studies the impact of WTO bindings on exports theoretically but not empirically. 1 0 Limão and Tovar (2011) note that the trade restrictiveness index for the typical country in the world is equivalent to a uniform tari¤ of 14% , but this jumps to 27% when non-tari¤ barriers are included. 5 place for months or years.
The ability to use unregulated trade policies can interact with macroeconomic or political shocks to generate considerable uncertainty. For example, there was widespread fear that the recent economic downturn would result in a substantial increase in protectionism. This included the possibility of anti-dumping measures; increases in developing country tari¤s from their applied level to the maximum allowed under the WTO; and the use of government procurement measures. Even though the worst fears of a trade war were not realized, the real possibility of the outcome created uncertainty, as evidenced by governments repeated assurances that they would not resort to 1930's type protectionism.
One of the central reasons for the formation of the GATT was the desire to avoid the disastrous tari¤ wars in the 1930's, which shut down many markets to exporters. To this day the GATT's successor, the WTO, lists as one of its functions and principles: "Predictability through bindings and transparency [to] promote investment (...)" (www.wto.org). However, multilateral agreements are themselves uncertain in terms of timing, negotiation outcomes and implementation. Moreover, the WTO does not fully constrain or regulate all types of trade policy and this generates TPU in periods of crisis, as discussed above, but also in quieter times. A number of examples stand out as long term sources of TPU: …rst, quality and safety concerns raise the possibility that certain products may be banned from a market, e.g. genetically modi…ed foods in the EU; second, the U.S. threat of import duties to counter Chinese currency manipulation; third, the possibility of using "environmental" duties at the border to o¤set di¤erences in carbon emissions in production. Even if these policies are unlikely, if they do materialize they would hurt exporters and can thus have important impacts in current investment and export decisions, which our model attempts to capture.
Another source of TPU is the ability to discriminate against di¤erent exporters by providing preferential market access. There are currently hundreds of preference schemes re ‡ecting both trade and non-trade motives (Limão, 2007) . They are a potential source of TPU in the world trading system for several reasons.
First, …rms now face an additional source of price uncertainty due to the possibility that a …rm from another country will receive a preferential tari¤ reduction. Second, trade preferences can generate additional uncertainty about any future multilateral tari¤ reductions.
11 Third, some agreements can increase TPU for the recipients of the preferences themselves. For example, unilateral preferences such as the General System of Preferences are subject to renewal and cancellation risk by the "donors"(the U.S., EU and other developed countries) and can thus generate TPU for the recipients (developing countries).
While preferences may generate an increase in TPU in the world trading system, some reciprocal PTAs may reduce it for its members. They can do so by securing low (often zero) …xed tari¤ rates and substantially lowering the risk of non-tari¤ barriers (e.g. U.S. PTA partners were exempt from the steel safeguards). One 1 1 Limão (2006) and Karacaovali and Limão (2008) …nd that preferences provided by the US and EU respectively caused them to maintain relatively higher multilateral tari¤s against the rest of the world in the Uruguay Round. Estevadeordal et al (2008) …nd that PTAs within Latin America generated reductions in external tari¤s in those Latin American countries. 6 particularly useful way to try to isolate and estimate a TPU reducing role of reciprocal PTAs is to consider cases where it primarily secures pre-existing preferences. There are several such cases. For example, Peru and Colombia, which received unilateral preferences from the U.S., sought reciprocal PTAs with the U.S.
to secure permanent preferential access and argued this security would be important for export investments (cf. USITC, 2008) . Similarly, several countries who sought or are seeking PTAs with the European Union previously received some form of preference. As we will argue below Portugal's European integration also secured pre-existing preferences. Thus its experience may still be relevant for several other countries.
Portugal' s European Trade Integration
In this section we summarize the background and some stylized facts of Portugal's European trade integration. We then provide evidence that the growth in entry and exports after EC accession cannot be fully explained by standard determinants and discuss some additional motivating evidence for our model. The main objective of this section is not to test a speci…c channel by which accession worked but rather to gauge its aggregate importance and argue that this is a relevant episode to test speci…c predictions at a disaggregate level, which we do in section 5. Portugal's trade with neighboring Spain remained highly restricted until the EFTA-Spain agreement of 1980. This agreement began a partial liberalization of Spain's tari¤s against the EFTA countries. In the …rst phase from 1980-1983, a three tiered system of reductions on industrial products would reduce tari¤s by 25% to 60% with EFTA partners. Portugal was granted even greater reductions of up to 80%.
13 A second phase of reductions over a period of indeterminate length was supposed to commence in 1984. The EFTASpain agreement contained no de…nite timetable or scheduled reductions for the second phase and thus the existing preferences in the …rst phase were potentially incompatible with GATT Article XXIV's requirement that PTAs implement zero tari¤s on substantially all trade. Moreover, the preferential reductions between 1 2 While our focus will be on the role of agreements in generating integration, it is interesting to note that dissolving agreements may cause disintegration. We …nd that Portugal's trade share with EFTA countries increased from about 20% in 1960 to 30% in 1973. But the exit of Denmark and the UK (which accounted for half of Portugal's trade with EFTA) to join the EC in 1973 initiated a rapid and strong decline in Portugal's trade share with these countries. Spain and EFTA in place by 1983 were simply extended and then renewed multiple times by an oversight committee. Thus, before 1986, Portuguese exporters faced considerable uncertainty about whether they would maintain preferential access to Spain. This uncertainty about the elimination of tari¤s is clear from a GATT report where one of its members noted that the EFTA-Spain agreement "provided only an expectation that at some point in time the duties and other regulations of commerce would be eliminated but no speci…c provisions existed in this respect. There was a great di¤erence between an expectation and a speci…c plan and schedule". "Agreement between the EFTA countries and Spain", Report of the Working Party," L/5405, October 24, 1980, p.3 1 5 Authors'calculations based on data from Pinheiro et al (1997) To examine if net entry is di¤erentially larger for preferential markets we contrast it to the growth in the number of …rms exporting to large non-preferential markets such as the U.S. As the dotted line in Figure 2 shows there was positive and rather substantial net entry of exporting …rms into the U. Figure 2
This di¤erential growth towards the preferential markets cannot be fully explained by standard determinants of trade ‡ows. To study this we estimate an aggregate gravity equation for Portuguese exports. To address the potential endogeneity of PTAs (e.g. because they may be more likely between countries that already trade more) we include bilateral …xed e¤ects, which control for any time invariant bilateral trade determinants (e.g. distance, colonial ties, etc.). 19 We also include year e¤ects to control among other things for Portuguese productivity and price changes (since we use nominal export values). Moreover, we control for bilateral nominal exchange rates, price de ‡ators in the import country and their real GDP. By interacting an EC accession time dummy (=1 for 1986 and subsequent years) with the member country dummies we can then test if Portuguese exports to Spain or EC-10 grew di¤erentially relative to the rest of the world.
To avoid confounding the trade policy e¤ects of accession with other possible motives why accession may 62% in this 13 year period. But export growth is faster after the 1986 accession and the EC share in Portugal exports goes up to 73% in only 7 years. The strong increase in trade shares with the EC after 1985 was not merely a switch away from exporting to other markets. There is strong evidence of trade creation: total real exports in 1993 were almost twice as high as in 1985 (Pinheiro et al., 1997) .
have increased trade, as discussed below, we end our sample in 1990.
The results in the …rst column of Table 1 show an increase of 23 log points towards the EC-10 in the post-accession period that cannot be accounted for by the standard determinants. That increase is 5 times larger for Spain. Given our interest in the role of investment and entry we also go beyond the standard gravity estimation and use the (ln) number of …rms as a dependent variable. Those results, in the second column of Table 1 , show that the number of …rms exporting to Spain and the EC-10 was signi…cantly higher than to other countries after accession, even after controlling for standard gravity determinants.
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We now discuss more speci…c …ndings; some of these guide our subsequent modelling assumptions. First, we …nd that the typical new Portuguese exporter to a given market (de…ned as a …rm exporting to a country at t but not t 1) is smaller than a continuing …rm (about 6 times smaller for Spain and 20 times for the EC-10). This is one reason why we focus on a model of heterogenous …rms with …xed costs of entry.
Moreover, this size heterogeneity implies that if accession had increased the number of entrants but not the average sales of continuing …rms then we should observe a reduction in average sales per …rm as we …nd for the EC-10 in column 3 of Table 1 . This is one reason why in our model we focus on the e¤ect of policy uncertainty on entry rather than on sales of existing …rms.
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One of the central objectives of the paper is to determine the relative importance of applied vs. expected policy on export investments and volumes. Analyzing this issue is particularly interesting if policy changes have large e¤ects on the number of …rms and this translates into signi…cant new investment and aggregate exports. As the results in column 2 show the accession lead to a large additional number of …rms. Moreover, in the working paper we …nd evidence that this increase mainly re ‡ects new entrants (as opposed to fewer exits) and is thus likely to have required considerable entry investments.
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In sum, there is evidence of a strong growth in the number of Portuguese …rms and aggregate exports towards the EC following accession that can't be explained by standard determinants. Given that Portuguese 2 0 We believe this accession e¤ect is not driven by either of the following alternative explanations: monetary integration and infrastructure investments. It is unlikely that the estimated accession e¤ect is due to exchange rate e¤ects or the prospect of a monetary union for two reasons. First, the sample we use ends in 1990-two years before the signing of the Maastricht Treaty setting out the timetable for the Euro and nine years before the exchange rates were irrevocably …xed. Second, if accession a¤ected exchange rates then these e¤ects are controlled for by including its level (as we do in the baseline results) and its volatility, both of which did not a¤ect the accession coe¢ cients (the estimated trade elasticity to volatility is negative but quantitatively inconsequential). Portugal received substantial EC support for transport infrastructure. But this funding only started in 1989 so it could at most have started to reduce trade costs in 1990 and thus can't explain the large trade increases before then.
2 1 Average exports by …rm to Spain remained unchanged but this is still consistent with the model since Spanish applied protection fell, thus increasing average sales of continuing …rms.
2 2 It would be simple to see that new entrants also generated considerable export growth if we knew accession had not a¤ected the exports of continuing …rms. In that case column 1 of Table 1 would re ‡ect only entrants' exports but otherwise that is an upper bound on the role of entrants on aggregate exports. In the working paper, we provide evidence that even though entrants are smaller they had a signi…cant impact on aggregate exports. First, the raw data shows that entrants (those that did not export just before the agreement was implemented but did so shortly thereafter) account for a substantial share of export growth between 1986 and 1990 (over 54% for Spain and 73% for the EC). Second, we employ a gravity approach to predict the e¤ect of accession for di¤erent subsets of …rms and …nd that about 30% of the predicted increase in exports is accounted for by new …rms. exporters already enjoyed some preferences in Spain and zero tari¤s in the EC-10 (on manufacturing) these large impacts of accession seem puzzling. The model in the next section provides a potential explanationthe agreement removed policy uncertainty faced by exporters -and shows how to test it.
Theory
We now model the impact of policy uncertainty on …rms'investment and export entry decisions. First, we determine the optimal demand, supply, pricing and pro…ts for each …rm conditional on exporting. Second, we examine its decision to invest to enter that market and how it is a¤ected by policy uncertainty.
Demand, Supply and Pricing
The utility function of the representative consumer, U = Q q 1 0 , is identical across countries and de…ned over a numeraire good, denoted by 0, which is homogenous and freely traded on world markets, and a subutility index, Q, de…ned over di¤erentiated goods with constant expenditure share . We consider a CES aggregator over a continuum of di¤erentiated goods, indexed by v, from the set of available goods For simplicity of exposition we focus on a symmetric structure with common elasticity of substitution,
Each country i has aggregate income equal to Y i and consumers in i face prices p iv so their optimal demand for each v, q iv , is standard and given by
where
is the CES price index. The consumer price, p iv , includes any existing trade costs. We focus on ad valorem import tari¤s and note that they are generally not …rm speci…c but rather product or industry speci…c, and denote the tari¤ factor that i sets on the group of products V by iV 1 , so free trade is represented by iV = 1. Therefore, producers of any v 2 V receive p iv = iV where iV will be unity if the good is produced and sold in i (i.e. we assume no domestic sales taxes).
We …rst determine the optimal price and operating pro…ts for each monopolistically competitive …rm conditional on supplying a market. The marginal cost parameter, c v , is constant and heterogenous across …rms. We can interpret 1=c v as either labor productivity or the productivity of an input bundle, so given a wage, w e , in the exporting country e, the …rms'marginal cost is w e c v . Since our analysis focuses on …rms in a particular exporting country we drop the "e" subscript.
In a deterministic setting the …rm simply chooses prices (or quantities) to maximize operating pro…ts in each period, iv = (p iv = iV wc v ) q iv , leading to the standard mark-up rule over cost, p v = wc v = , and the consumer faces this price augmented by any import tari¤ in that industry.
Under uncertainty we need to be clear about the timing of the …rm's production and pricing decisions.
We allow the …rm to make all its production and pricing decisions after the policy and thus demand are known, so only its investment decision will be made under uncertainty. This production ‡exibility has two basic implications. First, the pricing decision is exactly the same as above. Second, we are making the …rms less averse to policy risk, e.g. to variability in tari¤s, after they enter the market since they can optimally adjust to shocks and their operating pro…ts are convex in the policy. To clearly see the last point we substitute the optimal price into demand to calculate revenue received by the producer
We can see that, all else equal, the export values for a …rm that has entered a market are directly a¤ected only by the current applied policy-there is no direct e¤ect of uncertainty. This occurs because production occurs after the uncertainty is resolved. Therefore the direct impact of uncertainty on individual …rms in our model will arise via the investment/entry margin rather than the intensive margin.
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Substituting revenues into the operating pro…t expression and simplifying we obtain
, summarizes aggregate conditions, e.g. domestic wage, w, and foreign demand. 25 In general, we can allow for stochastic innovations to A i that are independent of innovations to tari¤s. We control for such dynamics in the empirical section, but we do not model them here.
2 4 Uncertainty could a¤ect the intensive margin via the price index if the resulting change in the number of exporting …rms is su¢ ciently large. In the empirical application we consider a small exporter so this e¤ect is negligible (and addressed econometrically), therefore we also abstract from this indirect e¤ect in the model. 2 5 We are ignoring exchange rates but these can be incorporated and would simply entail rede…ning A to include a multiplicative e¤ect ex i . Since this variable does not vary across product it will not have a …rst order e¤ect in our empirical results and thus we do not include it here. Future work may consider interactions in uncertainty processes between tari¤s and exchange rates and try to estimate those second order e¤ects.
Firm Value, Investment and Export Entry Setup
We focus on how foreign TPU a¤ects the decision to enter export markets. Therefore, we assume there are no …xed costs to enter or produce in the domestic market (as in Helpman et al., 2008) . As such, for each industry V there exists a mass of …rms in the exporting country equal to n V ; all of which produce for their home market but only a subset of them, to be determined, will export to any given market.
26 As we noted above, these …rms are heterogeneous only in terms of their productivity, which has a cumulative distribution function G V (1=c) that is strictly increasing.
To serve a foreign market a …rm must …rst make a …xed cost investment that is sunk. As noted in section 2 there is evidence that these investments can be large when it comes to serving foreign markets.
To understand the basic e¤ect of these costs consider …rst a deterministic environment where pro…ts are constant. A …rm considering entering a new export market invests and enters if the present discounted value of its pro…ts exceeds the investment cost of entry
We allow this investment to be destination market and possibly industry-speci…c in that …rms producing v 2 V all face the same cost, but this cost may di¤er for another industry. In a purely deterministic environment, the discount factor re ‡ects only the "true"discount rate R, but it is straightforward to show that the expression above also applies when operating pro…ts are constant but there is an exogenous "exit" probability, , in which case = (1 )=(1 + R). This de…nes a zero pro…t cuto¤ for unit costs as a function of the tari¤, c D ( iV ) for …rms considering exporting product v 2 V to country i
Clearly tari¤ reductions induce entry since they increase demand and thus allow the …xed cost investment to be covered even by …rms that are less productive. The elasticity of the cuto¤ to a once-and-for-all change
It is also clear that the cuto¤ is common to all …rms that face a similar tari¤ and …xed cost, so for v 2 V all …rms with c v < c D ( iV ) enter. The marginal entrant is the least productive and thus smallest, which is consistent with the …nding that new exporters are smaller than incumbents.
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As we discuss in section 3 there are several potential sources of TPU that exporters face. Moreover, potential exporters can optimally choose not just whether to invest but when to do so. Therefore ongoing policy uncertainty generates an option value of waiting, which can have important e¤ects for investment.
The analysis below applies for each …rm in an export country e that is considering the decision to invest to enter in market i and sell some good v so we drop these subscripts for simplicity.
Formally, the …rm's decision to enter an export market is modeled as an optimal stopping problem.
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Firms can be divided into exporters and non-exporters. The value of being an exporter is denoted by e and such a …rm exits only when hit by a "death" shock since it has no other …xed costs after it enters. 29 Nonexporters enter a foreign market only when the value of exporting net of the sunk entry costs, K, exceeds the option value of waiting, w . The value of this option in our model arises because in the following period conditions may improve and so the …rm may be better o¤ waiting until that occurs and then entering. The investment and entry decision rule for each …rm, identi…ed by its unit cost requirement c, can be de…ned as a function of a threshold tari¤ that makes it indi¤erent between entry and waiting.
So, any tari¤ t (c) triggers entry by any …rm with cost c. To determine this export cuto¤ and the impact of policy uncertainty we next describe the policy process and then de…ne these value functions.
Trade Policy Regimes
There is no clear typical empirical (or theoretical) characterization of the stochastic path of trade policy.
Our objective here is to provide such a characterization that is both tractable and rich enough to span alternative trade policy regimes. To maintain tractability we choose a speci…c stochastic process for the foreign policy and assume that domestic exporting …rms take it as given. But we argue that the process is general enough to capture alternative determinants of trade policy (e.g. economic or political) and span trade policy regimes with high uncertainty or low uncertainty for example.
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Each period there is some probability that a policy shock occurs (e.g. a new agreement, a new government, a macroeconomic shock, etc.). 31 If the shock occurs then a policy maker reconsiders the current policy and sets a new one denoted 0 , otherwise the policy is unchanged. Firms form expectations over future policies based on their belief of and a probability measure of tari¤ outcomes,
, where H is the worst case scenario. We assume that both and H are similar across …rms within a given industry V so that entry decisions in each industry will depend only on a …rms' productivity relative to a cuto¤ rather than informational asymmetries.
Therefore, at a given point in time, the stochastic path of the policy is characterized by the current tari¤, t , and what we call the "policy regime", which is described by the pair ( ; H). Firms believe that the regime is time-invariant and so our results below apply to any given exogenous and H. We will then compare equilibrium …rm behavior across di¤erent regimes. One advantage of this characterization is that it can encompass alternative settings in the form of di¤erent regimes. When 2 (0; 1) the model captures a setting with imperfectly anticipated shocks of uncertain magnitude. Alternatively, if = 1 and H is degenerate at some value of 0 then the model captures a perfectly anticipated reform where the government credibly committed to 0 in the following period. When = 0 the government has committed to the current tari¤, t . The model can also capture staged tari¤ reductions that are typical in agreements, provided that their implementation is not certain.
We will not examine all possible alternative regimes but rather focus on the ones that seem most relevant for the analysis of trade agreements. In particular, the following section considers two experiments. First, we contrast reductions in the current tari¤ within a credible policy regime (where reduction is expected to be permanent, = 0) vs. reductions within a regime where the policy is expected to be reversed ( > 0).
Second, since one of the stated goals of trade agreements is to reduce TPU, we will examine …rm behavior under a regime with TPU ( > 0) and one without ( = 0), holding the current policy value …xed. We note that the changes in the policy distribution that are entailed by the latter experiment may generate changes in both the mean and higher order moments of , as is the case in most trade agreements. For didactic purposes we will point out how to isolate the e¤ects due to the mean vs. other moments when possible. 
Value of Credible vs. "Incredible" Policies
The prospective exporter's decision to enter or wait given the current trade policy t depends on a set of value functions, which we now derive. We then solve for the equilibrium value of exporting to examine the value of credible vs. "incredible"(i.e. non-credible) policy changes. Since the value functions apply for each …rm with cost subscript c v , we omit this to simplify the notation.
The expected value of starting to export at time t conditional on observing t is 3 2 To do so note that the long-run mean of the policy is in the limit solely determined by the mean of the distribution H ( 0 ), denoted E ( 0 ), as are all other moments. However, since t has persistence whenever < 1, this parameter will generally a¤ect the policy distribution. If we want to examine the impact of a change in regime that maintains the policy mean unchanged we can do so by considering changes in starting at the long-run mean. To see this, note that the expected value of the policy at any future period n is Et ( t+n j t) = (1 )
which includes current operating pro…ts upon entering and the discounted future value. With probability 1 , there is no policy shock and the …rm value next period is still e ( t ). With probability , a policy shock arrives changing the policy to some value, 0 , and so the third term is the ex-ante expected value of exporting following a shock, which is given by
Note that E e ( 0 ) = E ( 0 )= (1 ), which is time invariant and simpli…es the analysis. 33 Note however that the conditional mean of the tari¤ and expected value of exporting, e ( t ) , still vary over time since they depend on the current tari¤.
We then compute the expected value of waiting as
A non-exporter at time t receives zero pro…ts from that activity today. In the following period the continuation value is still w if no policy shock arrives (the …rst term) or if the shock still entails a tari¤ above the trigger (the second term). If a policy shock arrives, it will be below with probability H( ) and the …rm will …nd it optimal to pay K and transition to the exporting state. The conditional expected value of exporting if in the last term is given by
This equation is structurally the same as (9), but it is time invariant. The key di¤erence is that pro…t ‡ows are evaluated ex-ante at the conditional expected value of exporting for a …rm that enters following a more favorable policy shock.
The set of four equations (9), (10), (11) and (12) is linear in four unknowns: e ( t ), E e ( 0 ), w and
). Thus we can solve explicitly for the value exporting and waiting at the current tari¤ for a …rm that has a threshold tari¤ (c). We still omit c from (:) for notational simplicity. 34 e ( t ; c) =
The interpretation of e ( t ; c) is straightforward: after investment, the value of exporting conditional on t equals the discounted value of expected pro…ts. If were zero this would be the deterministic value
But with a probability > 0 the policy will change and the ensuing per period expected pro…ts are E ( 0 ). If the current tari¤ is above a given …rm's trigger, t > (c), then it does not export today and its value, w (c), would be zero if the tari¤ remained above that trigger, but with some probability H( ) the tari¤ will fall below the trigger and so the …rm will incur K and export. The expected value of exporting is then captured by the remaining terms in brackets, which are similar to those in e except we must use E ( 0 j 0 ) instead of ( t ).
We can now ask what is the value of being an exporter under alternative policy settings.
First, a lower current tari¤ increases the expected value of exporting at any , as is clear from (13). We would like to ask if this increase is higher if the tari¤ reduction is is credible, that is if = 0 so the exporters expect the policy to remain unchanged or if it is "incredible", i.e. expected to be revised with probability > 0. The …rst basic point is that the credible agreement is more valuable for the exporter since the tari¤ reduction is permanent, that is
This complementarity between reductions in current tari¤s and uncertainty suggests one reason why some PTAs may not succeed in expanding trade by much: they reduce only applied tari¤s but not uncertainty.
In the empirical section we will quantify this e¤ect and show its potential importance.
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The second point, which is related to the …rst, is that even if the initial agreement is "incredible" so pre > 0, and it has been in place for some time there may still be considerable value to making it credible, i.e. of having post = 0. In these cases the agreement need not change current policies at all but simply make them certain. If the current tari¤ in the initially incredible agreement is su¢ ciently low, e.g. if t = 1, then the reduction of uncertainty increases the value of exporting as shown by the expression below.
This value of moving from an uncertain free trade regime to a certain one provides one motive why the recipients of unilateral preferential tari¤s spend considerable resources in attempting to make them permanent through formal PTAs. Examples include GSP preferences provided by most developed countries as well as European and U.S. special preferences to developing countries. Since the EC-10 and Spain's preferences toward Portugal prior to 1986 were uncertain, this change in value captures one of the important channels by which entry into the EC bene…ted Portuguese exporters. To determine if uncertainty reduction was an important factor we now examine the predictions of the model for investment and entry into foreign markets, which we will then estimate.
Policy Impacts on Investment and Entry
Using (14), (13) and the expression in (8) we can determine the threshold tari¤ that would leave any given …rm with costs c indi¤erent between starting to export or waiting. From an empirical perspective it will be more useful to recast this in a di¤erent way and ask what …rms will invest and enter at any given current tari¤. We have assumed that …rms can be ranked by their productivity (the inverse of unit costs 1=c)
according to a strictly increasing CDF. Therefore, for any current tari¤ t , we can determine a cuto¤ cost
A …rm with costs equal to c U t is indi¤erent between investing today and starting to export or waiting. As will be clear that will also be true this period for all …rms with lower costs if they had not yet started to export. The model has a closed form expression for c U t in terms of the current tari¤. First, we set the di¤erence between e and w equal to entry costs and by simplifying the terms we obtain
Entry requires that the …xed cost does not exceed the sum of the three terms on the RHS, each of which has an intuitive explanation for the marginal entrant. The …rst term is the discounted ‡ow of pro…ts at the current tari¤. We note that in a deterministic model, the …rm would discount by rather than (1 ) and the next two terms would disappear. The second term is the present value of expected pro…ts, ex-ante, following a shock. The third term is non-positive: it is the present value of the expected loss of entering today, given that the next policy change is at or below the tari¤ entry trigger.
We combine the expression in (17) with the operating pro…t function in (5) to solve directly for c U t as a function of the current tari¤. The full expression is in the appendix, after some simpli…cation we obtain
Note that the deterministic model cuto¤, c D t , is a special case, which obtains here if = 0. Otherwise, the cuto¤ condition also depends on the uncertainty term, denoted by U t , which captures the frequency of policy shock arrivals and expectations about future tari¤s. We can show that uncertainty in this model generates a lower cuto¤, requiring …rms to be more e¢ cient to enter, than a deterministic tari¤ at the level t . To do so note that we must have U t 1, which requires that ! ( t ) 1, as is clear from the equation above. In the appendix we derive this term as
This is the proportional reduction in operating pro…ts expected to occur if we start at the trigger tari¤ t and a policy shock occurs that (with probability 1 H( t )) worsens conditions by generating a tari¤ above that trigger level. This inequality is always strict except when the trigger is exactly at the maximum of the tari¤ distribution in which case the cuto¤ is the same as the deterministic one evaluated at that maximum tari¤. Note also that even though the policy shock can trigger a lower or higher tari¤, it is only the latter possibility that a¤ects the decision.
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In sum, the model predicts that policy uncertainty increases the hurdle for …rms to invest and enter into new markets relative to the deterministic case. This occurs despite the convexity of operating pro…ts in tari¤s. The cuto¤ equals the deterministic level at = 0 and any increases in lower this cuto¤ under the real option approach at any initial tari¤ below the maximum. This includes cases when t is at its long run mean, so that any increase in represents a mean preserving change in the policy distribution.
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The closed form solution for the cuto¤ provides other useful insights that we explore in the empirical work. First, we can derive an uncertainty entry cost premium, s, which we de…ne as the minimum entry subsidy rate required for the marginal …rm under deterministic policy to enter under uncertainty. Formally, this is given by the subsidy rate s on …xed costs such that c . Note that if the same rate, s, is o¤ered to all …rms that had not exported under uncertainty then we obtain the same distribution as under certainty or under a case when tari¤s are credibly expected not to rise so ! ( t ) = 1. Since s is a summary statistic for the impact of uncertainty on entry that requires no …rm speci…c information on productivity we will provide an estimate for it.
We also use (18) to derive the estimation equation. As an intermediate step it is useful to record the semi-elasticity of the cuto¤ with respect to
which is negative given ! ( t ) 1 .
3 7 This is an example of the "bad news" principle …rst identi…ed by Bernanke (1983) and is due to the fact that good news has a symmetric e¤ect on payo¤s whether the …rm is already in or not (since it can enter after the shock) whereas bad news will only a¤ect those that are already in.
3 8 We can also consider the impacts of increased uncertainty on entry in terms of mean-preserving changes in the long-run distribution, H. More speci…cally, there are mean preserving spreads of H that reduce ! and thus the entry cuto¤. To see it most clearly consider for example, moving some of the mass around t above it and some below it in a way that leaves the mean E ( ) unchanged. This lowers 1 H ( t) for given E( j t), where the latter can be kept approximately unchanged if the extra mass at the upper tail is appropriately distributed.
Consider now the impact of applied tari¤s on the cuto¤. In the absence of uncertainty that elasticity is simply 1 , as shown for the deterministic case. It is simple to see that is also the limit value for
Since most work, theoretical and empirical ignores the uncertainty component we will take that as our null hypothesis, = 0, and test if this uncertainty parameter has any …rst order e¤ects . To do so we employ a …rst order, log linear Taylor approximation to c U t ( t ; t ) around = 0 and the original applied policy values ( 0 ). We provide the derivation in the appendix. The general form for any period t is
where r t captures second and higher order terms of the approximation. This shows that increasing uncertainty has a …rst order e¤ect and reduces the cuto¤ even if we are initially at = 0 (i.e. in the deterministic case). This is true for any trigger value of the tari¤ and strictly so if that trigger is below the maximum tari¤. It also holds for cases when the current applied tari¤s are zero, which stresses the point that even …rms that currently, and possibly for some time, have faced zero tari¤s may not enter if there is some chance that policy will be reversed in the future. We also see that increasing applied tari¤s around = 0 changes the cuto¤ by 1 , the deterministic elasticity.
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In sum, we have shown that one potential bene…t of an agreement with a country that already applies low policy barriers is to remove uncertainty about those policies. We have also shown that such an agreement will generate entry and identi…ed one potential way to measure the degree of that uncertainty, ! ( 0 ) 1.
The …nal point that we note is that even though the real option approach we employ is somewhat more complicated than the standard net present value (NPV) calculation (which only allows …rms to make a once and for all entry decision) it has two distinct advantages. First, the real option approach clearly captures the behavior of …rm investment more closely since they have the option to wait and time their investments.
Second, some qualitative and quantitative results are di¤erent under the two approaches, as we show in the working paper. Most notably, increases in at given high tari¤s can raise the value of exporting (see footnote 36) and this would increase entry under the NPV approach but lowers it under the real option approach.
We now use the theoretical framework to address two questions. What are the …rst order e¤ects of current policy and uncertainty on …rm entry into exporting? Do trade agreements reduce uncertainty? We will address these in the context of Portugal's accession to the EC in 1986, which, as we argued in section 3.2, secured pre-existing preferences in some goods and lowered tari¤s faced by Portuguese exporters in others. We …rst describe how to compute a theory-based measure of uncertainty related to the lost pro…t term, ! ( ); and how to relate the unobserved cost cuto¤ to observables, namely …rm export decisions. We then describe the data and implementation, the baseline estimates for entry, and their quanti…cation. The baseline estimates follow the model closely and so are parsimonious, so we also provide some robustness tests. The …nal section goes beyond entry and examines the implications for export values.
Empirical Approach

Measuring policy uncertainty
To construct ! ( t ) we require a speci…c tari¤ probability distribution H. We employ a discrete distribution that is tractable and covers the main cases that are present in our data. After a policy shock exporters consider three potential tari¤ values, low , medium or high. the possibility of transitional preferences that were mostly a feature of Spanish policy towards Portugal prior to the agreement. It is important to stress that the latter were transitional and could not remain for long since they were not GATT legal, as we discuss in section 3.2. Therefore although we did observe "medium" tari¤s during the mid 80's, the Portuguese exporters likely placed a probability close to zero (p m 0) that these would remain since either an agreement would be signed and tari¤s would transition to the low state or negotiations would fail and no preferences would remain.
In the Supplementary Appendix we show that if the tari¤ was initially high or medium then we can use
The term in square brackets is the percentage pro…t reduction conditional on a shock that moves tari¤s from tiV to the worst case scenario, hiV , which happens with probability p hiV . The same term applies to cases when the initial tari¤ is low and p miV is negligible. 40 Alternatively, if we consider only a two state world, s = h; l , the expression above applies to tari¤s with either history. Note that the tari¤s are di¤erent across markets and industries. Moreover, the applied tari¤ may change over time but the worst case tari¤, hiV , is constant in the data over the short period of time we analyze. With information on these tari¤s and an elasticity assumption (which we describe below) we can construct industry and time varying measures of this pro…t reduction measure.
We cannot observe the probabilities that exporters place on a worst case scenario, i p hiV . However, we can estimate this as part of the entry equation, provided we assume it is roughly common across industries and countries, i.e. we can estimate p h . The similarity across countries in our application is more reasonable if we restrict our attention to i =Spain, EC-10, which are the markets that Portugal secured access to. Our goal is then to test if there was a regime change, i.e. if p h fell after accession.
Unobserved cuto¤s and …rm export entry
While we do not directly observe whether …rms have costs above or below the cuto¤ we do observe the number of …rms and their export status at the country-product level. Our model focuses on variation in policies over time and across products and the cuto¤s we derived are common across some sets of …rms. In particular, producers of a variety v exporting to i will all face a tari¤ that does not discriminate by …rms, but rather by product or industry classi…cation, denoted V , and so those producers also face the same critical cuto¤ c U tiV . Therefore we examine the fraction of exporters in an "industry" V to each country pair. This approach has another advantage: it does not require us to be able to follow speci…c …rms over time, which is important since we are unable to do this between 1985 and 1986.
The number of …rms (or varieties if the …rm exports more than one product) exporting in V to market i is at least equal to the mass of domestic producers in V , n tV , times the fraction of those …rms with costs below the cuto¤, G(c U tiV ). Therefore the relationship between the observed number of …rms, n tiV , and these theoretical measures is ln n tiV = ln G(c
where u tiV is a random disturbance term due to measurement error. The term can also capture the potential for "legacy" …rms: those that survive until period t even though they have costs above c U tiV . This cannot occur if current conditions are better than in the past, so a su¢ cient condition to rule out legacy …rms is that c U tiV maxfc U T iV 8 T < tg. In this case, G(c U tiV ) exactly captures the fraction of exporters to this market. In the case of Portugal in the mid-80's exporting conditions were improving, as is clear from the observed high entry rates into EC countries. Therefore, we do not think legacy …rms pose a signi…cant issue in this particular setting. Nonetheless, our working paper we argue that our approach and results are robust to certain instances where legacy …rms are present.
If the productivity follows a Pareto distribution with minimum productivity 1=c V then G (:) = c U tiV =c V k .
So entry has a constant elasticity with respect to the cuto¤, the shape parameter k, which we assume is similar across industries.
Baseline model
Our basic estimation equation can then be obtained by substituting ! ( tiV ) from (21) into the cuto¤ expression (20); and then substitute this into the share equation in (22) and use the Pareto distribution to obtain for each t; i; V
We recall the the three assumptions in the baseline estimation to identify the e¤ect of uncertainty: (i) the shape parameter k is constant over time and common across V (but the other parameter c V may vary);
(ii) the elasticities of substitution are constant over time and similar across sectors; (iii)the probability of reversal to a high tari¤ p h is common across industries, V and countries, i (but …rms have market and industry speci…c information about the impact of that worst case scenario on pro…ts). Recall that at any point in time …rms treat the regime as time invariant. In the estimation we want to test if the regime changed after accession, so we include a T subscript in T p T h where T = 0 denotes parameter values for years pre-accession and T = 1 post-accession. In the robustness section we will discuss the impact of relaxing some of these assumptions.
We can then write the estimation equation in terms of parameters and observable variables as follows ln n tiV = b T!tiV + b ln tiV + a ti + a iV + a tV +ũ tiV for each t; i; V
where! tiV
captures the uncertainty measure and its impact on entry is estimated by
The coe¢ cient on the applied tari¤ is b = k = ( 1). The a x terms represent country-year, country-industry and industry-time e¤ects that absorb among other things, the demand and cost conditions in A ti , the investment cost K iV (and any time invariant costs of exporting, e.g. transport or other non-tari¤ barriers, that we abstracted from in the theory), the productivity distribution heterogeneity across industries c V as well as other terms that vary at the "x" level and were previously included in the remainder term, r tiV , and in u tiV . The remaining part of the disturbance that varies at the tiV level are included inũ tiV .
We estimate (24) in di¤erences taking a period after the agreement was implemented, t = 1, and one before it, t = 0.
We are interested in testing if there was more entry in industries with higher initial uncertainty, b 0 > 0, and whether the agreement reduced the probability of a worst case scenario ( b 0 > b 1 ), or even eliminated it (b 1 = 0). If uncertainty played a signi…cant role we will then quantify it. To identify these e¤ects it is important that, even in the change equation, we control for importer e¤ects, which absorb any shocks speci…c to those markets. We also control for industry e¤ects to capture any productivity, regulation or other industry shocks that had a common e¤ect on …rm entry to both EC-10 and Spain, the most obvious being Portugal's own trade liberalization. Therefore the identi…cation will rely on di¤erential tari¤s and uncertainty that Portuguese exporters within each industry faced in the EC vs. the Spanish market.
Data and Implementation
To estimate (25) we collect detailed data on trade policy for Spain and the original EC-10 countries before and after the agreement, as described in more detail in the data Appendix. So the uncertainty measure varies not only across industries but also across members of the agreement. For some industries the policy data are recorded at a …ne level of disaggregation, so they could potentially be matched to 6-digit NIMEXE classi…cations for the trade data, which includes over 5000 products (NIMEXE is the predecessor of the Harmonized System). We do not test the model at this disaggregated level for a few reasons. First, the model suggests that we de…ne industries according to a set of characteristics (such as productivity distribution) that is common across a set of …rms and clearly broader than the 6-digit level. Second, most of the variation in the policy occurs across industries, rather than within them at the product level. About 80% of the variation in applied tari¤s and 75% of variation in the uncertainty measure in exporting to the EC-10 before the agreement are accounted for by di¤erences across 2-digit industries (of which there are 99). Those fractions are lower for Spain but still more than half of the variation is accounted for by cross-industry di¤erences.
Third, even in 2-digit industries where there is some variation in tari¤s, an exporter's perception of the worst case scenario is likely to be broader than what is implied by the worst case for a single 6-digit good since he may either export multiple goods and/or fear tari¤ changes simply because they are reclassi…ed.
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To construct the uncertainty measure we …rst take hi for a product to be the ad valorem conventional GATT tari¤ that country i (EC-10 or Spain) had before the agreement. 42 We take 0i to be the tari¤ that i actually applied to Portuguese exports in that product before the agreement, where we employ data on the set of preferences that these countries provided to Portugal, as described in section 3.2. We then construct the uncertainty measure in (21) using elasticity values that are consistent with the data for these countries ( = 3). In the robustness section we provide supporting evidence for this choice of elasticity and show the results are robust to alternative values. We then aggregate this measure and the applied tari¤ to the 2-digit industry level using a simple average.
The tari¤s that Portuguese …rms exporting to Spain faced in the years 1985 and 1987 appear in Table   2 . The average industry in Portugal enjoyed preferential tari¤s that were nearly 50% below the tari¤ levied on the rest of the world. Moreover, we …nd that this di¤erence is not driven by any one set of goods or industries. Using the measure of pro…ts lost previously derived we calculate that if Portugal were to lose these preferences, the typical exporter would see his pro…ts reduced by over 16% per annum. Note also that despite the preferences, Portugal did not enjoy duty-free access to Spain prior to the agreement, it faced tari¤s of almost 8% on average. Therefore there is scope for gains from applied tari¤ reduction, uncertainty reduction and the complementarity e¤ect between the two, which we described in the theory. With respect to the EC-10, the table shows Portugal enjoyed lower preferential tari¤s by 1985 but the proportional loss in pro…ts was nearly as high as in Spain at 15%. The magnitude of EC tari¤ reductions in 1987 is small since tari¤s in industrial products were already zero prior to accession. Table 3 provides estimates of the parameters in (25). We …nd that entry is negatively a¤ected by applied tari¤s, as predicted by the theory. Moreover, the coe¢ cient on initial uncertainty, b 0 , is positive, implying that entry was strongest in the industries that initially faced higher uncertainty.
Baseline Estimates
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One potential concern with the results in column 1 would arise if ad valorem tari¤s were only one part of the protection faced by Portuguese exporters that changed. If protection that used other instruments fell by more in industries with higher uncertainty this would bias our estimates. Therefore we control for changes in "non-tari¤ barriers"and speci…c tari¤s in columns 3 and 4 respectively. Both have the predicted negative sign but they are insigni…cant. Neither a¤ects the baseline results for uncertainty and applied ad 4 1 If we were to run the model at the 6-digit level there would be a large number of zeroes. Since our estimation equation is in logs we would eventually have to drop those categories, which could be where uncertainty was most important.
4 2 If that tari¤ was not bound in the GATT then we use the autonomous ad valorem tari¤ that i applied. 4 3 Note that the policy measures vary across industry and for Spain vs. the EC-10 but not within industry across the EC-10. Therefore we compute clustered standard errors that allow for arbitrary correlation across EC-10 countries within each industry, and similarly for Spain. valorem tari¤s. The results are also robust to including other policy measures (in columns 5 and 6), which we discuss in detail in the robustness section, either individually, or in combination.
The results discussed thus far exclude any uncertainty measure for the period after the agreement. This re ‡ects an implicit assumption that the coe¢ cient on that variable is insigni…cant, i.e. that the agreement was credible and eliminated the preference reversal, b 1 = 0. We test this hypothesis directly in column 2 by including the potential pro…t loss term evaluated at the post agreement tari¤s,! 1iV . We …nd that this variable has no signi…cant e¤ect, i.e. we can't reject that p h1 1 = 0, nor can we reject that the probability of a reversal has fallen, i.e. p h1 1 < p h0 0 . This insigni…cance of uncertainty after the agreement and the fact that the restricted version in column 1 is preferred by standard information criteria (shown in the last two rows of Table 3 ), leads us to focus on the restricted as the baseline.
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The theory implicitly assumes single product …rms. However, it can be easily re-interpreted as applying to a …rm's decision to invest in order to introduce a new product into a country and that is why we focus on the growth of …rm-product pairs, i.e. varieties. New varieties include both those …rms entering new market-industry pairs and …rms expanding the number of products within a given market-industry pair.
Three pieces of evidence indicate that our data and estimates mainly re ‡ect …rm entry into a new marketindustry. First, the typical Portuguese exporter sells only two varieties (at 6-digit Nimexe) both in 1985 and 1987 (the average is also approximately unchanged at 6). Second, the average variety entry in our sample is 36% and most of this is accounted for by …rm-industry growth, 33% (Table 2) . Moreover, the latter also accounts for about 0.84 of the variation in variety growth. Finally, when we use market-industry growth as a dependent variable we …nd results similar to those using varieties in table 3. In fact, the implications for the estimated probability of reversal are the same, as we subsequently show in Table 7 . 45 Our baseline estimation strategy already addresses several potential concerns. Recall that we di¤erence out time invariant country-by-industry e¤ects and explore variation over time and within industry across countries. One potential concern is pre-existing growth trends in speci…c destination markets or industries (either global demand or Portuguese supply trends in speci…c industries). These trends could bias our results and we address the concern by including industry and country e¤ects in the baseline speci…cation in changes. These industry and country e¤ects also address other potential sources of bias, which we now note. First, they control for possible changes in …xed or sunk costs that are industry or destination market speci…c (e.g. accession could have lowered …xed or sunk costs of entry through streamlining of customs procedures or raised them through additional rules of origin). Second, the accession may have changed the share of intermediate goods in Portugal's exports as well di¤erentially across industries, but industry e¤ects would capture this change. Third, the increase in trade between Portugal and the EC could have a¤ected exchange rates, but this aggregate shock is addressed by the country e¤ects.
Our baseline results appear to be robust not only to the potential concerns noted above, but also others, that we will discuss in section 5.5. Therefore we now focus on examining the relative impact of the policies.
One simple measure of this impact is how much variation in entry each of the variables explains. For the full sample we …nd that a one standard deviation reduction in applied tari¤s leads to a 0.14 standard deviation increase in entry whereas for the uncertainty variable that e¤ect is 0.4, which is almost 3 times larger. Using the model structure we can go considerably beyond this in quantifying the impact of each policy and their complementarity.
Quanti…cation and Counterfactuals
We now employ the baseline results in Table 3 to estimate the probability of reversal and quantify the importance of uncertainty on entry and value of exporting.
Policy Reversal Estimates
Recall from our discussion of the estimating equation (24) that the coe¢ cients for initial uncertainty and tari¤s in column 1 of Table 3 map to the parameters of the model as follows: b 0 = p h0 0 k= (1 ) and
. Therefore we can estimate the probability of reversal before the agreement as
The …rst row of Table 4 shows that the baseline estimate is 0.39 ( = 3). 46 Given that we placed no constraint on the estimation it is remarkable that the estimate falls in the theoretically feasible range between zero and one. Moreover, we compute its standard error to be 0.17, which allows us to reject that it is zero. This indicates that exporters in 1985 believed that the policy was neither …xed, i.e. 0 6 = 0, nor certain to improve, i.e. p h0 6 = 0, so the reform was not fully anticipated. We also re-estimate the baseline in column 1 of Table 3 at alternative values of = 2; 4 and …nd that the reversal point estimates are all in the feasible range; they increase slightly in , but the di¤erences are insigni…cant. Thus we focus on the intermediate estimate generated by = 3, which is also the more relevant elasticity for this data, as we argue in the robustness section.
4 6 We assume = 0:85, which is consistent with the Portuguese data. Recall that = (1 )=(1 + R) so our assumption is equivalent to alternative reasonable combinations of these parameters. Our choice was determined by using the average real interest rate for Portugal in 1983-1995, R = 0:03, and an annual death shock probability = 0:125. The latter is similar to what other authors assume (cf. Constantini and Melitz, 2008, p.24) and is also consistent with the Portuguese data where we …nd that annual …rm exit rates from production is about 0.17 (calculated from Quadros de Pessoal) which is an upper bound for the exogenous death shock probability since it includes endogenous exit decisions.
Given that p H captures an ex-ante average exporter belief, it is hard to de…nitively argue that a particular estimate is too high or low. In order to provide additional quanti…cation it is useful to ask what reform scenarios the estimates are compatible with and whether any seem unreasonable. The baseline reversal estimate of p h0 0 = 0:39 is consistent with two extreme beliefs before the agreement. Either the policy shock is fully anticipated, 0 = 1, and preferences are lost with probability p h0 = 0:39, or preferences will surely be lost, p h0 = 1, but the timing of the policy change is uncertain with an arrival rate of 0 = 0:39.
While we can bracket our subsequent quanti…cation estimates using these extremes we choose to focus instead on an intermediate case that seems more reasonable and where^ 0 = 0:62(= \ p h0 0 0:5 ) so the policy shock was likely but not certain, i.e. 2(.5,1). 
Policy Impacts on Entry
Since our estimates of imply it is at least 0.39 and entry is concave in this parameter we will not quantify the impact of entry using the …rst order approximation in the regression estimate since this will overestimate its impact. We will instead employ the estimated coe¢ cients to compute the impact implied by the theory holding all else equal:
where we focus on the baseline estimates where uncertainty is removed, i.e. U 1 = 1. Note that the expression in brackets can be rewritten in terms of the estimated parameters, b 0 and b , the data! 0iV and a given assumption on the arrival rate such as^ 0 = 0:62, which we can then average over the observations. 48 In table 4 we show that this removal of uncertainty alone generates a growth in entry of about 8 log points, which is similar across alternative . Given there were about 40428 country (…rm-product) pairs in total in the sample this predicts an additional 3167 pairs by 1987. The impact of uncertainty removal can generate as much as 24 log point growth for those industries where the fraction of pro…ts lost is highest.
We now turn to the elasticity of entry with respect to tari¤s. In the absence of uncertainty that is simply 4 7 The intermediate magnitudes seem more reasonable than any of the extremes given the historical context provided in Section 7. These intermediate estimates are consistent with the following exporter beliefs in late 1984: talks would collapse and preferences removed with probability p h0 0 = 0:39; or talks would continue, but no policy shocks would arrive, and the current regime would continue with probability 1 0 = 0:38 or talks would succeed and the accession would go forward with probability (1 p h0 ) = 0:23. The no change probability seems reasonable given the already long path since the start of the discussions. While the belief of success would seem low given the ex-post realization of the event, we think it may reasonably re ‡ect the information embodied in the 1985 export decisions. To see why note that about half of all shipments in 1985 had already occurred by March and likely re ‡ect decisions to invest that were made 3-6 months earlier, i.e. in 1984, so well before the accession agreement was signed in June of 1985. Moreover, the typical shipment date in 1986 is May, which is two months later than usual (and two months after the agreement came into force). This suggests exporters waited for reasons other than avoiding tari¤s, since in most industries the average applied tari¤ was at or near zero for EC-10 countries.
4 8 Conditional on this, the result does not require any assumption for , since its value is subsumed in the parameter estimate.
given by b . So, to the extent that uncertainty was eliminated, the reduction of applied tari¤s, generated about 4% growth in entry overall, distributed as follows: 2% into EC-10 (their mean reduction was only 0.7 p.p.) and 20% for Spain (mean reduction of about 7 p.p). Therefore the total predicted entry due to removal of applied tari¤s and uncertainty is about 12 log points (.04+.08), slightly lower for EC-10 (10) and higher for Spain (28).
We are also interested in decomposing the relative importance of applied tari¤ reductions if uncertainty had remained unchanged. To compute this counterfactual recall that the applied tari¤ also a¤ects the uncertainty term, U , so we must determine the total e¤ect of the tari¤ and how attenuated that entry elasticity is under uncertainty, i.e.
From (22) we see that this ratio is equal to the ratio of the cuto¤ elasticities,
, which we derive in the appendix, eq. (36). Therefore we estimate this attenuation factor using
Using the de…nition of expected pro…ts lost in eq. (21) we obtain
. We employ this and rewrite the expression above in terms of the estimated parameters and data. In Table 4 we show that this factor is 0.56, so under the initial uncertainty the same tari¤ reductions would have generated only about half as much entry than if uncertainty was absent. Another way to put this is that the impact of the tari¤ reduction when the uncertainty was also removed is substantially magni…ed. The result is not sensitive to the choice of .
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In table 5 we employ the estimates above to decompose the total predicted entry into three components:
reduction in uncertainty at initial tari¤s, reduction in applied tari¤s at initial uncertainty and the remainder, which captures the complementarity e¤ect. The …rst column shows the result for EC-10 and Spain combined.
Out of the total predicted growth, which was 12 log points, a share 0.65 (=8/12) is due to the uncertainty removal at initial tari¤s, another 0.15 is due to the complementarity e¤ect. The model predicts that on average accession would have only generated 0.19 of this entry if tari¤s had been reduced at the initial uncertainty. For the EC, if uncertainty had been unchanged then tari¤ reductions (mostly in agricultural products) would have generated almost no entry. Even for Spain tari¤ reductions alone would have generated only about 0.4 of the predicted entry.
One …nal point regarding quanti…cation is what fraction of the entry observed in the data can the policy changes implied by the theory predict. As we see, in Table 2 varieties increased by 0.36 so the model accounts for about 1/3 of this. There was a substantial increase in the mass of Portuguese producers in this period, 0.16 between 1985-1987 (authors calculations from Quadros de Pessoal). Recall that this is exogenous in our model. Thus we can also ask what is the share of predicted entry probability explained by policy, ln (n iV =n V ), we show in Table 5 that trade policy changes explain almost all this increase in the data for the EC, and 0.6 overall. 50
Policy Impacts on the Value of Exporting
We can also estimate the relative importance of applied tari¤s and uncertainty on the value of exporting rather than entry decisions. To do so we consider a similar counterfactual to the one before: what is the predicted total change in the value of exporting, e , and what fraction is accounted for by the uncertainty removal at initial tari¤s, the tari¤ reduction at initial uncertainty and the complementarity e¤ect.
Using (13) the growth due to the policy changes in the expected export value function for a given …rm is
We can see that this growth rate is similar across all …rms that export to the same market-industry pair.
Therefore we can calculate this for each iV pair. To do so we use E 0 (1 p h0 ) + p h0 h , where the approximation is exact in a two-state world. The results in table 6 employ the baseline estimates for = 0:62 and = 3, previously discussed. When we average this over all industries and …nd that those …rms export value grew by 9.6% (overall), more so for Spain (22%) than EC-10 ( 7.9%).
We then ask what e¤ect would have been observed if only uncertainty had been removed at the original tari¤s. We can again employ (13) to obtain
which yields an average growth of exporter value of 5.5% overall. However, the e¤ect is very uneven: for the EC this e¤ect accounts for almost 0.8 of the total e¤ect. But for Spain it accounts for none of the e¤ect.
The reason is that Spain still had relatively high tari¤s on Portugal and if uncertainty about them were removed, i.e. if they were made permanent, then they would not increase but they would also not decrease
either. This provides a nice illustration of the point we noted in the theoretical section that reductions in generate increases in the expected value of exporting when the applied policies are already low (the case of the EC) but not if the tari¤s are close to their mean (Spain). But even in the latter case the uncertainty removal at given initial tari¤s generates considerable entry, as predicted by the real option approach and con…rmed by the estimates in the previous subsection for Spain.
Given the last result for Spain it would be tempting to conclude that the applied tari¤ reductions alone were responsible for the large gain. However, we recall that applied tari¤ reductions under uncertainty have a limited e¤ect on exporter value, as shown in (15). We can verify this directly by calculating the impact of tari¤ reductions at the initial uncertainty by again employing (13) e ( 1 ; 0 ) e ( 0 ; 0 )
For Spain this implies an average growth of 4.8% so it accounts for only 0.22 of the total predicted e¤ect with the remaining, 0.78, being driven by the complementarity from applied tari¤ reductions made permanent by eliminating the probability of reversal.
An alternative way of measuring the cost of "incredible" reforms is the uncertainty entry cost premium, which we de…ned previously as the minimum entry cost subsidy rate required for the marginal …rm under deterministic policy to enter under uncertainty s iV = 1 U 1 iV . To induce entry at the same level as when there is no uncertainty the government would have to subsidize the 3167 …rms predicted to enter above. For the industries with highest uncertainty we …nd a subsidy rate of .22; on average we …nd it is .08. Without information on K iV we can't estimate the exact subsidy costs but the model allows us to compute an order of magnitude. The subsidy cost for a particular industry-country pair is 
Robustness: entry estimates
We now discuss some additional robustness tests of the baseline results.
Column 5 of Table 3 adds the change in the standard deviation of the tari¤ faced by Portugal in each industry, i.e.
(stdev ln tiv ) where v 2 V . This can help address concerns that the model is misspeci…ed and the true measure of uncertainty is not the one we have used. However, this standard deviation variable is insigni…cant and does not change the value or signi…cance of the theoretically based uncertainty measure.
We now provide some supporting evidence and sensitivity analysis to the choice of elasticity of substitution, . There are two assumptions: …rst, the typical elasticity within industry V is similar to the typical elasticity in another industry. Below we provide some direct evidence based on estimated elasticities for this sample that supports this assumption. Second, the elasticity of substitution across industries is similar to the typical elasticity within them. We do not have estimates for cross industry elasticities to fully justify this second assumption and thus we examine directly whether the results are robust to it.
Thus far our discussion has mostly focused on the case when the elasticity of substitution of = 3.
As we describe in our working paper, this is consistent with median estimates from Broda et al (2008) for Spain and the other EC-10 countries. Nonetheless, we also re-estimated the baseline regression for di¤erent elasticities and our central results are not sensitive to using = 2; 4 (Table 4) . We also …nd that the median elasticity across industries at our level of aggregation not does exhibit a lot of variation and is fairly similar across these countries.
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The elasticity of substitution may be lower across industries than within. Our model can be extended to accommodate this. In particular, if we assume that the subutility index Q in (1) is a Cobb-Douglas aggregator with shares V = then the elasticity of substitution across industries is unity (so smaller than ) and the relevant price index is now industry speci…c, P iV . Therefore, the key di¤erence in the theory is that the A term is now
Our baseline estimation is in di¤erences and we can show that a number of components that this alternative speci…cation of demand introduces are di¤erenced out. Moreover, the use of industry and country e¤ects implies that we are only left with the residual variation in P tiV that varies simultaneously at the country and industry level, which we denote by ln p tiV . This residual variation is only an issue if it is correlated with the policy measures. Recall that P tiV re ‡ects the prices of all varieties sold in that industries in country i so it will be dominated by varieties other than Portugal's (since the latter is a small exporter). Therefore we do not think that Portugal's expansion into their markets had a substantial direct e¤ect on ln p tiV .
However, there may be omitted variable bias if a third factor a¤ected these indices and was correlated with the changes in policy faced by Portugal. The most obvious candidate would be if the EC-10 or Spain were simultaneously reducing their tari¤s on the rest of the world and those reductions were correlated with the policy changes they were implementing for Portugal. This was not the case for the EC-10 external tari¤ in the period we consider. However, Spain was reducing its external tari¤s on the rest of the world (to converge to the EC-10 common tari¤) and these reductions were correlated to the ones faced by Portugal. Therefore we use changes in Spain's tari¤s to the rest of the world to proxy for ln p itV .
The results that control for industry and country speci…c price index changes are presented in column 6
of Table 3 . We …nd a positive relationship between the price index and entry. This is as predicted by the theory: an increase in the price index in an export market makes Portuguese exporters more competitive and thus raises entry. This e¤ect is insigni…cant and including it does not change the baseline results regarding uncertainty or the applied tari¤ e¤ects. The same is true if we also include all the other applied policy controls in columns 2,3 and 4. Since these controls are insigni…cant and do not a¤ect the key coe¢ cients we focus on the baseline result without them, which is also preferred by standard information criteria.
A separate robustness issue we investigate is the role of agricultural products. One potential concern with the agricultural products is that they are subject to non-tari¤ barriers. If these NTBs are not changing then they are controlled for by the country industry e¤ects, a iV . If they are changing, as we know they are for Spain, and are doing so in a way that is correlated with our uncertainty measure this would bias our estimates. One way to address this is to control for NTB changes directly. We did so in column 3 of Table 3 and veri…ed the results did not change. One may also object to applying a monopolistic competition framework to agricultural goods and argue that they should be dropped altogether. We are agnostic about this but nevertheless when we do drop basic agricultural goods we still …nd that the uncertainty measure still has an e¤ect similar to the baseline.
53 Table 7 provides two other robustness tests. First, we re-estimate the baseline using entry of …rms per industry into a market. This alternative dependent variable leads to the same probability of reversal, as we can see comparing column 2 with the baseline in column 1. Thus the entry e¤ect we capture is mostly one of …rm entry in an industry, as previously argued. Second, in column 3 we re-estimate the baseline using growth in varieties between 1987 and the average in three years prior to the agreement (1983) (1984) (1985) . The probability of reversal is still positive and signi…cantly di¤erent from zero. Its value is slightly lower than when we focus on 1985 as the pre agreement period, which suggests that in 1983-4 the exporters believed policy was less likely to change. A similar result holds for …rms (column 4).
In sum, the baseline estimates are fairly robust to alternative potential concerns.
Policy Impacts on Total Exports
While our main interest is on the impact of policy on entry and export …rm value, we can also employ our framework to analyze the value of exports. In this section we present the basic estimation equation, which we relate to the structural parameters and then use to quantify the relative impacts, in an exercise analogous to the one for entry in Table 5 .
Total exports in any given industry to a particular market are the product of the number of varieties exported to that market (…rst bracket) and the average sales, denoted by R tiV .
We obtain R tiV by averaging (4) over all exporting …rms so it is a¤ected by applied tari¤s and re ‡ects the entry cuto¤. Using the expression for R, the Pareto distribution and the derived cuto¤, c U tiV , we obtain the export equation as a function of uncertainty and applied policy measures, as detailed in the appendix.
The estimating equation in di¤erences can be written in a format similar to the one for entry t ln R tiV = B 1!1iV B 0!0iV + B t ln tiV + a i + a V +ũ iV for each i; V
where the coe¢ cient for uncertainty is now B t = t p th 1 (k ( 1)) and for the tari¤ it is B = k 1 .
We estimate this equation based on the di¤erence between 1987 and 1985, as done for the entry model, and …nd that both of these variables have the expected sign and are statistically signi…cant. We also …nd that the post agreement uncertainty e¤ect is insigni…cant. The exact parameter estimates for B t and B themselves are not as interesting as the quanti…cation exercises that they allow us to perform so we focus on the latter. For example, using the baseline assumption of = 3, we derive the implied probability of reversal; the point estimate is 0.45 and we can't reject that it is equal to the estimate obtained with the entry equation (0.39). We then use this reversal estimate, assuming = 0:45 0:5 , and the structure of the model to predict the impact of policy on exports.
Similarly to the entry exercise, the total predicted export growth due to policy is given by the sum of the uncertainty removal at initial tari¤s, ln R iV j 1 =R iV j 0 (derived in the appendix), and the tari¤ reduction in the absence of uncertainty (B t ln tiV ). We …nd this is 34 log points for the EC-10 and Spain combined.
The average growth in the data is 55 log points (as seen in Table 2 ) so the policy change predicts a large fraction of this. The predicted change accounts for an even larger fraction of the observed value if we net out the increase in the mass of …rms, the term n tV , which is exogenous in the model and grew about 16 log points. When we take this into account the model explains 0.87 of the remaining growth, as shown in the last column of the …rst row of Table 8 .
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In Table 8 we also decompose that predicted growth in a way that is analogous to the entry results in Table 5 . The fraction of the 34 log points accounted for by the uncertainty removal at initial tari¤s is 0.59. To calculate the counterfactual impact of tari¤ reductions at the initial uncertainty we …rst derive the attenuation e¤ect,
, in the appendix and estimate it is 0.69. This is less than unity and thus con…rms the complementarity of tari¤ and uncertainty reductions for export values. 55 We can see that complementarity e¤ect accounts for almost a quarter of the predicted growth for Spain, which is about the same fraction as the uncertainty e¤ect at initial tari¤s. For the EC most of the growth was due to the direct uncertainty removal e¤ect (0.75), which is reasonable since most tari¤s were already at zero.
This contrast in the sources of growth of exports provides another interesting motive to consider both the EC-10 and Spanish case since some recent PTAs may look more like the EC-10 case (e.g. Colombia securing pre-existing preferences received in the U.S. market) and others like Spain's (e.g. Korea obtaining tari¤ reductions and securing them).
Conclusion
We provide a framework to study the e¤ect of TPU on …rm investment and export decisions. Despite its dynamic nature, the model is highly tractable and delivers clear predictions for how to empirically compute TPU and estimate its impact. Applying this to a speci…c setting that is particularly appropriate, we …nd that, (i) before accession to the EC, Portuguese exporters stood to lose about 16% of exporting pro…ts if they lost their preferences in the EC-10 or Spanish markets and (ii) they believed such an event had a real probability of occurring before the PTA. The agreement eliminated this TPU and the overall trade policy changes can account for a considerable share of …rm entry and export value in the data (more for the EC-10 than for Spain). If, counterfactually, the applied tari¤ reductions had been implemented at the original TPU level then only 20% of the total predicted …rm entry growth would have been realized. These results have policy implications for the many countries still receiving unilateral preferential tari¤s, which are subject to the discretion and uncertainty of policy making, as Portugal was before 1986. Thus our results provide one reason why these programs are not always successful in promoting trade and investment and how this may change if those preferences are secured through formal PTAs.
Our framework can be used and extended to address various other interesting questions. First, the basic structure of the model can be applied to other settings. One example is tari¤ bindings in the WTO (as in Handley, 2011 more fundamentally our results suggest that these evaluations should focus on models that are inherently dynamic.
In conclusion, our results highlight why and how much trade policy uncertainty a¤ects investment and entry into new markets. While credibility is often mentioned as an important component of a policy reform, it is generally di¢ cult to measure its impact. To the extent that our approach and results do just that they may be of broader interest to economists and policy makers interested in evaluating the impact of other policy reforms on …rm-level decisions.
A Theory Appendix
The set of equations in (9),(10),(11), and (12) is linear in the four unknowns. The solution to the current values of exporting, e ( t ), and waiting, w ( t ), are respectively (13) and (14) in the text. The unconditional expected value of exporting is E t e ( 0 ) = E[ ( 0 )]=1 and the conditional value is
2. Cuto¤ expression (c U t ) We combine the expression in (17) with the operating pro…t function in (5) to solve directly for c U t as a function of the current tari¤
Using this and the de…nition below for ! ( t ) we obtain (18) in the text.
Pro…t loss expression and bound (! ( t ) 1)
We denote the maximum tari¤ by h .
where the last inequality follows from (1 H( t ))E( j t ) + H( t ) t t and the fact that the LHS is a weighted average of two terms, one equal to t and the other equal to E( j > t ), which is less than t . When the current tari¤ is at the maximum of the support of H( ) such that t = h , then the di¤erence in brackets and the term (1 H( t )) are both zero.
Current tari¤ impact on pro…t loss (d!( t )=d t 0)
As t increases, the pro…t lost from being hit with a shock to a higher tari¤ is reduced so
In semi-elasticity terms, this becomes
This implies that as the current tari¤ t increases, the proportional gap between the deterministic and uncertain cuto¤ narrows. We can see that that if t = h the derivative goes to zero. Then
and the elasticity of the cuto¤ under uncertainty evaluated at the tari¤ maximum equals the elasticity at the deterministic cuto¤. ln where is 1+advalorem rate at product level that GATT members faced in Spain or EC-10, which is then averaged to Nimexe 2-digit industry.
c,d
Pre Tari¤ (Portugal) ln where is 1+advalorem rate at product level Portugal faced in Spain or EC-10, which is then averaged to Nimexe 2-digit industry.
Post Tari¤ (Portugal) ln for immediate post agreement period that Portugal faced in Spain or EC-10, constructed as described in previous section.
Applied Tari¤ Standard Deviation Change std(ln ) where the standard deviation is over tari¤s Portugal faced in each Nimexe-2 industry; the change is between the pre and post tari¤. 
INE
New exporter in year t Firm exporting to a market at t but not in t-1 i Gross entry rate in year t (Total # new exporters in t)/(# exporters t-1). i Gross exit rate in year t (# exporters with positive exports in t-1 and none in t)/(# exporters with positive exports in t) Pinheiro et al (1997) . Indices are yearly price de ‡ators of export goods to all destinations. i. Authors'calculations using trade data matched to …rm employment data (Quadros Pessoal) by INE.
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B.2 Aggregation to Total Exports
In this appendix we derive the estimating equation for total exports presented in the text and the expressions used to decompose the policy e¤ects in Table 8 .
In the text we note that the total export value to a given country in an industry V is R tiV = n tV G c Table 8 is therefore ln R tiV j 1 ln R tiV j 0 = k
The total impact of applied tari¤ changes under uncertainty is
The leading term is the full elasticity of total exports to tari¤ changes and the term in brackets is the attenuation, which is equal to @ ln R @ ln j 0>0 = @ ln R @ ln j 1=0 , and is reported in Table 8 . It is straightforward to show that the attenuation term is always between zero and one.
To obtain the estimation equation (33) in the text, we take a …rst order approximation of the uncertainty term around = 0 and substitute that and the constructed measure! tiV in (40) to obtain ln R tiV = B T!tiV + B ln tiV + a ti + a iV + a tV +ũ tiV for each t; i; V
where B T = T p T h 1 (k ( 1)), B = k 1 and the a x terms capture all the terms in tiV de…ned above. If we then di¤erence this equation we obtain (33). Notes: Sample means and standard deviations (in parentheses), all multiplied by 100. * 100 × ∆ ln(x) where x = {firms, varieties, exports}. **100 × ln(1 + t) where t is the advalorem rate; "Pre tariff" is evaluated in 1985 (pre-accession); one measures Portugal's preferential rate and the other tariffs faced by GATT members; "Post Tariff" is the 1987 (post-accession) tariff faced by Portugal; "Tariff Change" is a simple difference. *** See Appendix B for sources and additional details. Profit loss:1 − (τ 0V /τ hV ) σ (assuming σ = 3). We normalize the loss measures in regressions by dividing it by σ − 1. Conditional on p h , the attenuation and theoretical uncertainty term U can be derived using regression estimates independently of β assumptions. We take p h = (Pr. reversal) 0.5 and compute attenuation and entry growth at mean ω. The attenuation factor is the ratio of the entry elasticity to tariff changes at initial uncertainty relative to no uncertainty, see equation (28). We compute entry due to uncertainty removal as the log difference in the number of entrants at post vs. initial uncertainty using k × [ln(U 1 ) − ln(U 0 )] and assume post-uncertainty is removed, U 1 = 1. We use the initial uncertainty estimate from Table 3 in calculations (but results are similar if σ = 2, 4). Predicted average entry probability is the sum tariffs reductions, bτ ∆ ln τ , and removal of uncertainty at initial tariffs. Entry growth from uncertainty removal is the log difference in the number of entrants at post vs. initial uncertainty using k × [ln(U 1 ) − ln(U 0 )] (we assume post-uncertainty is removed, U 1 = 1). Counterfactual shares of predicted entry hold initial tariffs and uncertainty fixed, respectively. The complementarity share captures the remaining entry growth from simultaneously reducing tariffs and uncertainty. The share of predicted entry probability explained by policy is the ratio of policy predictions relative to the one observed in the data. − 1, see equation (13) and section 5.4. Using the same formula, the share of uncertainty removal is computed with initial tariffs held fixed at τ 0 followed by the share of tariff reductions with uncertainty held fixed at γ 0 > 0. The complementarity share captures the remaining exporter value growth from simultaneously reducing tariffs and uncertainty. Calculations use an initial uncertainty estimate from the total export regression where σ = 3 and the probability of reversal is estimated at 0.45, see section 5.6 and appendix (results are similar if σ = 2, 4). Average predicted total exports are the sum of the tariff reduction, Bτ ∆ ln τ , and the effect of uncertainty removal at initial tariffs. Total export growth from uncertainty removal is the log difference in exports at post vs. initial uncertainty using (k−σ+1)×[ln(U 1 )−ln(U 0 )] (we assume post-uncertainty is removed, U 1 = 1). Counterfactual shares of predicted exports hold initial tariffs and uncertainty fixed, respectively. The complementarity share captures captures the remaining export value growth from simultaneously reducing tariffs and uncertainty. The share of total export growth explained by policy is the ratio of policy predictions relative to exports observed in the data net of the aggregate growth in number of Portuguese firms.
